This is what they fear is happening following the victory of the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development (AK) party in the July 22 parliamentary election.
International media coverage repeats endlessly that the AK party is really moderate now. Despite Islamist roots, they say, it's now a centrist party concerned with Turkey becoming a member of the European Union member and having a prosperous economy.
Certainly, such is the image the party has projected over its five years in power, and there is some evidence to accept this conclusion. Half of Turkey's voters supported AK precisely because they became convinced that it had no Islamist intentions. The economy is doing well. Turkey might benefit from having a system more balanced regarding religion.
At the same time, though, there is also evidence to doubt that AK is going to be so benign. Even if the party is relatively moderate, it's nothing to rejoice about. No one knows what will happen, but to conclude that Turkey will prove the virtues of Islamists-gone-moderate is somewhere between premature and naïve.
Consider foreign policy. If the key issue in the Mideast is the spread of radical Islamism, does the AK government want to see this defeated in Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt or among the Palestinians? No.
Even if the AK government doesn't want to impose radical Islamism at home, it's certainly not the enemy of radical Islamism abroad. Once pro-Western, Turkey is now neutral, at best. The U.S.-Turkish alliance, a mainstay since 1946, is dead.
This does not mean the two countries are enemies. They still have good relations. But the two governments are not really allies any more.
Turks tend to attribute the problems to the Iraq war and to what they see as American indulgence of the PKK, the Kurdish terrorist group trying to seize southeastern Turkey. But the real issue is that the two governments are on different sides regarding the most important struggle of our time.
An equally worrisome issue is the long-run trend. What if AK stays in power for a long time? The combination of a large parliamentary majority and choosing Turkey's next president gives it tremendous powers. By naming the judges, it can shape the country's laws; by choosing the armed forces' commander, it can reverse the traditional bar on Islamic-oriented officers and neutralize the military's ability to intervene. Filling the bureaucracy with its supporters will move policies and their implementation closer to an Islamist agenda.
In eastern and central Turkey, cities are moving toward the kind of Islamic forms of belief and behavior supported by political Islamists.
Those who do not want to face the threat of radical Islam generally are eager to say that all is fine in Turkey — that the election was a victory for moderation and democracy, and that it's good to have a model of moderate Islamic-oriented politics governing that country. But the victory of AK is not exactly something to be celebrated, even if it can be managed.
To avoid the danger of it going too far, to ensure it stays moderate whether or not it wishes to do so, the regime must continue to feel under pressure to stay in the center. This means continuation of the army's power as guarantor of Turkish democracy; that the media not be intimidated; that courts remain independent. An erosion of these control mechanisms could bring disaster.
Few outsiders understand that one of AK's sources of appeal — and, ironically, a cause of anti-Western feeling among domestic critics — is its claim to enjoy support from the United States, Europe and Israel. Willingness to work with Turkey's government, even if it is an AK one, is not the same as wanting AK to be in power.
Western institutions, media and even governments should indicate in appropriate ways that the AK is not their client, and be ready to criticize its behavior.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Herzliya and editor of Turkish Studies.