Thus, Edgar Alan Poe began his remarkable 1839 short story, "The Fall of the House of Usher." Similar feelings beset me in contemplating the fall of the house of Arafat, the collapse of the PLO, of Fatah, and of Palestinian nationalism as a movement.
I won't go into that history of disaster in detail, but suffice it to say that what's happening now fits completely into that pattern.
Put your finger into the wine and flick one drop onto the plate for each item: 1948 war; 1967 war; failed West Bank guerrilla war; September 1970 in Jordan; terrorism; Lebanese civil war; intransigence; internal anarchy; the murder of the first moderates; corruption; incitement to terrorism and intransigence; throwing away the opportunity at Camp David; throwing away the opportunity of 1988 dialogue with the United States; the 1990s' peace process; and the second intifada. Forgive me for leaving out even more such examples.
Is there a pattern? Yes.
By seeking everything, they've gotten nothing. Having as one's goal the destruction of Israel and total victory, rather than a compromise solution, the movement sank ever deeper into the mire. Glorifying violence and terrorism brought death and destruction on the movement and its followers. Embracing extremism, incitement, and demonization of Israel brought Hamas as its logical outcome.
And now ask yourselves a question: Do you really believe that the Hamas coup is going to scare Fatah straight? Are these leaders and idealogues really going to learn their lesson?
This seems to be the main assumption of political leaders and the media in democratic countries. After all, to paraphrase the British essayist Samuel Johnson, facing the hangman greatly concentrates the mind.
But wait a minute. The PLO, Fatah and their hierarchies have made a whole career about facing the hangman and tweaking his nose while giggling madly. If they had learned from, say, September 1970 in Jordan or other disasters, it would have been sufficient for them to get on the right path.
Remember the Oslo process, and why was it going to work? Because, we were told, the PLO and Fatah were so weak and so buffeted by catastrophe as to finally understand they must change their ways or be destroyed.
But even if you want to believe that current Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is some peace-loving good guy, the reality is that he's weak, incompetent, has no following, and no intention of really confronting the culture of terrorism and extremism his own group created and maintains. He will also never give up the demand that all Palestinians should be able to live in pre-1967 Israel, which is a deeply personal belief of his.
Imagine a tourist goes into a bazaar shop, points at a carpet and declares, "This is the most beautiful carpet I've ever seen! I must have it no matter how much it costs? What's the price?"
This is how Abbas is being treated. His mere survival, no matter what he does, is being portrayed as such a marvelous asset that he's doing everyone a favor by taking their money and their help. Is this going to give him any incentive to change, an outcome already rather doubtful?
If he and his colleagues want to survive — and not end up as bloodied corpses on some Hamas video — they better clean up corruption, offer their people a moderate alternative and put an end to cross-border terrorism. It's their job to persuade us that we have a real reason for not watching Hamas butcher them and then loot their houses.
Otherwise, we'll be forced to stand by, like Poe's character, and watch those unwilling to save themselves.
Of course, fictional victims can be forgiven, as they are only stalked and killed once. They had no chance to learn their lesson. We do — and so does Fatah.
Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center, Interdisciplinary Center.